We introduce a general concept of multidivisible online/o ine (MDO) cryptography, which covers the previous works including online/o ine cryptographic schemes, divisible online/o ine signatures, incrementally executable signcryptions, and multidivisible online/o ine encryptions. We then present the notion of multidivisible online/o ine signcryptions (MDOSCs) as novel application of MDO cryptography. We de ne several security notions for MDOSCs and show implications and separations between these security notions. We also present a generic construction of MDOSC that achieves the strongest security notions with regard to con dentiality and unforgeability. Using MDOSC schemes, the computationally restricted and/or bandwidthrestricted devices can transmit messages in both con dential and authenticated way with low computational overhead and/or lowbandwidth network.
Introduction
In the emerging network environment, e.g., Internet of ings (IoT), more and more computationally restricted devices as well as bandwidth-restricted devices are connected to each other at any time in any place. Securing their communication is urgently required to make these environments sustainable and scalable. We can use cryptographic schemes as building blocks to achieve security for them, only if it is taken into account that the devices here have restricted resources.
Online/o ine cryptography, a fundamental concept for many cryptographic systems (e.g., signatures [1] [2] [3] [4] , encryptions [5] [6] [7] [8] , signcryptions [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] , and so forth), is a key to reduce computational costs of the devices sending their messages in con dential and/or authenticated way. e history of online/o ine cryptography began with online/o ine signatures proposed by Even et al. [2, 3] . e signing procedure of online/o ine signature scheme is split into the o ine phase and the online phase. e signer can perform all the computationally expensive operations in the o ine phase, i.e., in any idle time before the sender decides the message to be signed. en, in the online phase, i.e., after the message is determined, only lightweight operations are required to sign the message so that even low-power devices can handle the signing process.
As an extension of online/o ine signature scheme in the context of signcryption, the notion of incrementally executable signcryptions (IESCs) was proposed in [12] . Here, a signcryption process is split into three subprocesses, where the sender can activate each subprocess incrementally by its given sequential input: the sender's own key pair, a recipient's public key, and a plaintext message to be sent to the recipient. We can utilize signi cant intervals between these three subprocesses to perform as much precomputation as possible.
To save the transmission bandwidth as well as computational cost, Gao et al. [4] proposed the notion of divisible online/o ine signatures (DOSs). Using DOS, intermediate outputs can be securely sent to the receiver in the o ine phase so that the senders can save not only computational resources but also transmission bandwidths in the online phase.
Applying the above attractive features of DOS as well as IESC to public-key encryption schemes, the notion of multidivisible online/offline encryptions (MDOEs) was proposed in [14] . In MDOEs, encryption process can be executed in at most three steps and at most three partial ciphertexts can be transmitted one-by-one.
Our contributions: in this paper, we propose a general concept of multidivisible online/offline cryptography (MDO cryptography, for short), which covers the online/offline cryptography, divisible online/offline signatures, incrementally executable signcryptions, and multidivisible online/offline encryptions.
In general, MDO cryptographic schemes have the following features:
Incremental processing: a sender's process can be divided into two or more subprocesses Incremental sending: outputs of intermediate subprocesses can be sent prior to all the subsequent subprocesses ese features enable us to save both computational overhead and transmission bandwidth, on which we can construct secure communication platform for IoT-like environment.
As instances taking full advantage of these two features of MDO cryptography, we introduce notions of multidivisible online/offline signcryptions (MDOSCs) and divisible online/offline tag-based KEMs.
We define parameterized security notions of MDOSCs, denoted as (k, n, q)-dM-IND-iCCA for confidentiality and (k, n)-dM-UF-iCMA for unforgeability, with regard to three parameters: the level of divisibility k, the number of users n, and the number of queries per user q. en, we analyze all the relationships, i.e., the implications and separations, among these security notions.
We also present a generic construction of MDOSC that achieves the strongest security notions of both confidentiality and unforgeability.
Expected application scenario: Figure 1 shows a usage example of our MDOSCs, where a signcryption algorithm is split into three subalgorithms, i.e., sc 1 , sc 2 , and sc 3 , each of which can be processed incrementally and can send outputs to recipient incrementally. e sender in our example system consists of the following three components: a computationally powerful cloud with sc 1 , an energy-restricted mobile device with sc 2 , and the most computationally restricted as well as bandwidth-restricted IoT device such as a sensor node with sc 3 . Both the sender and the receiver in our system can access a shared storage. We assume the receiver has enough computational resource to decrypt signcrypted messages received from the sender. Firstly, the sender uses cloud computing to execute the most computationally expensive algorithm sc 1 with the sender's own key pair (sk S , pk S ) to generate partial ciphertext Σ 1 , store it into the shared storage, and also store state information φ 1 to the storage of the mobile device. ese procedures can be repeatedly executed depending on the storage capacity of the mobile device and the costs for using cloud computing as well as shared storage. Next, when the sender recognizes the target recipient to whom she might send some messages and obtains the receiver's public key pk R , the sender's mobile device executes lessexpensive algorithm sc 2 with φ 1 and pk R to generate partial ciphertext Σ 2 , transmit it to the receiver, and store state information φ 2 to the storage of the IoT device. ese procedures can also be repeatedly executed depending on the storage capacities of the IoT device and the receiver. After that, when the IoT device is ready to send a message m (e.g., typically very short numeric value sensed by sensor), it executes the least expensive algorithm sc 3 with φ 2 and m to generate partial ciphertext Σ 3 , transmit it to the receiver. Note that Σ 3 is reasonably short since the cryptographic information for decryption (unsigncryption) has been already transmitted as Σ 1 and Σ 2 . Finally, the receiver securely obtains the message m by unsigncrypting Σ 2 and Σ 3 with separately downloaded Σ 1 from the shared storage as well as pk S and sk R using the unsc algorithm.
Organization of this paper: this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces basic notations used in this paper. In Section 3, we introduce the concept of MDO cryptography and discuss its instances including MDO signatures, MDO encryptions, and MDO signcryptions. Section 4 formally defines the notion of MDO signcryptions and its security notions. e relations between the security notions of MDOSC are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 shows a generic construction of MDOSC and comparison with previous signcryption schemes as well as usage example of our MDOSC construction. Concluding remarks are given in Section 7.
Notations
For n ∈ N, [n] denotes the set 1, 2, . . . , n { }. We write x ⟵ y or y ⟶ x to indicate that x is the output from a function or an algorithm y, or the assignment of the value y to x.
x ⟵ $ X denotes the operation of selecting a random element x from a set X. We write A.x to indicate explicitly that the algorithm x belongs to the scheme A. We write z ⟵ A(x, y, . . . ; oracle 1 , oracle 2 , . . .) to indicate the operation of a turing machine A with inputs x, y, . . . and access to oracles oracle 1 , oracle 2 , . . . , and letting z be the output. Unless otherwise indicated, algorithms are randomized, i.e., it takes a source of randomness to make random choices during execution. In all the experiments (games), every number, set, and bit string is implicitly initialized by 0, empty set ∅, and empty string ε, respectively. We write Pr[G Y X (A) � b] to indicate the probability of the event that adversary A outputs b in attack game G Y X .
Multidivisible Online/Offline Cryptography
In this section, we propose a concept of (multi)-divisible online/offline (MDO) cryptography as a generalization of online/offline cryptography. is concept can be applied to various cryptographic primitives, such as encryption schemes and signature schemes. MDO cryptographic 2 Security and Communication Networks schemes have the two features: incremental processing and incremental sending.
Incremental Processing. In a cryptographic primitive, a list of several inputs (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k ) is processed by an algorithm ALG to compute y � ALG(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k ), which is sent via a (insecure) channel. In contrast, ALG in MDO cryptography is split into k(≥1) subalgorithms ALG 1 , . . . , ALG k , and
are computed instead of y � ALG(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k ). y � (y 1 , . . . , y k ) is treated as the output of ALG. φ i (i � 1, . . . , k-1), state information, is assumed to be secretly stored and will be consumed only once by subalgorithm ALG i+1 .
For a more general model, k inputs are grouped into k ′ (≤k) input groups, (x 1 ′ , . . . , x k′ ′ ). In this case, ALG is split into k ′ subalgorithms. By this definition, our concept enables us to model wide variety of systems in a unified way. For example, an online/offline scheme is a special case where inputs are divided into two groups, a message and the others. Moreover, an ordinary cryptographic scheme can be treated as a special case where all inputs are grouped into only one input group, i.e., k ′ � 1.
Grouping of inputs should depend on the timing when each input is given to the sender.
Incremental Sending. To save transmission bandwidth, it is desired to send each partial output y i one-by-one.
However, it is known that a scheme could be insecure if each y i is allowed to be sent one-by-one, even when the scheme is secure if all the y i 's are sent at the same time [14] . erefore, we need extended security notions that capture new types of adversary exploiting partial output y i 's for attacks.
In the following, we show several MDO cryptographic primitives including: signatures, public-key encryptions, key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs), tag-based key encapsulation mechanisms (TBKEMs), and signcryptions.
Signatures.
We recall the notion of divisible online/ offline signatures (DOSs) [4] . A divisible online/offline signature scheme DOS consists of the following algorithms: init( ) ⟶ λ (the public parameter generation algorithm): it outputs public parameters λ to be used by all parties gen(λ) ⟶ (sk, pk) (the key generation algorithm): it generates a key pair (sk, pk) for signing and verification sign 1 (λ, sk) ⟶ (φ, σ 1 ) (the offline signing algorithm): given public parameters λ and a secret key sk, it outputs state information φ and an offline signature token σ 1 . We require that σ 1 ≠ ε sign 2 (φ, m) ⟶ σ 2 (the online signing algorithm): given state information φ and a message m, it outputs online signature token σ 2 ver(λ, pk, m, σ 1 , σ 2 ) ⟶ v (the deterministic verification algorithm): given a public key pk, a message m, and signature tokens (C 1 , C 2 ), it outputs 1 (accept) or 0 (reject)
We require the correctness for DOS, namely, for any λ ⟵ DOS.init( ), any (sk, pk) ⟵ DOS.gen(λ), any m ∈ Security and Communication Networks 0, 1 { } * , any (φ, σ 1 ) ⟵ DOS.sign 1 (λ, sk), and any σ 2 ⟵ DOS.sign 2 (φ, m), we have DOS.ver(λ, pk, m, σ 1 , σ 2 ) � 1.
As an attempt, we might try to extend DOS to MDOS, multidivisible online/offline signatures, based on our framework. More specifically, we could further split sign 1 (λ, sk) into sign 1-(λ) and sign 1+ (sk). While this splitting is possible theoretically, it does not provide significant benefits to senders in practical. is is because public parameters λ and secret key sk are obtained by senders almost at the same time in most applications so that senders cannot take advantage of the precomputation of sign 1− . We therefore do not try to formalize the syntax of multidivisible online/ offline signatures in this paper. Nevertheless, we can provide the security notions for it based on multidivisible online/ offline style to capture the unforgeability notion for ordinary signatures [15] as well as the notion for divisible online/ offline signatures [4] in a unified way.
We define the security notion of (strong) unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks ((k, n)-UF-CMA and (k, n)-sUF-CMA) as follows.
Let DOS be a DOS scheme, and let A be an adversary. e (k, n)-X-CMA-advantage of A against DOS is defined as
where the attack game G (k,n)-X-CMA DOS is defined in Figure 2 .
DOS
(A) ≤ ϵ holds for any adversary A that runs in time t and makes at mostueries to oracle sign.
Note that the notion of (1, 1)-UF-CMA is equivalent to the standard unforgeability notion for ordinary signatures [15] , whereas (2, 1)-UF-CMA is identical to the notion for divisible online/offline signatures [4] .
We also define the notion of smooth divisible online/ offline signature scheme in a similar fashion with a smooth KEM [16] .
Definition 2. Smoothness Smth DOS for DOS is defined as follows:
where the expected value is taken over λ ⟵ DOS.init( ); (sk, pk) ⟵ DOS.gen(λ). We say DOS is ϵ-smooth if Smth DOS ≤ ϵ holds.
Public-Key Encryptions and KEMs.
e notion of multidivisible online/offline encryptions (MDOEs) was proposed in [14] . It captures both the desirable features of identity-based online/offline encryptions [5] [6] [7] [8] and divisible online/offline signatures [4] , that is, a part of encryption can be executed even when the public key to the receiver is unknown and partial ciphertexts can be sent to the receiver even when the sender's inputs (e.g., a public key or a plaintext) are not fully determined. Concrete constructions are also proposed in [14] , which allow the computationally restricted and/or bandwidth-restricted devices to transmit ciphertexts with low computational overhead and/or lowbandwidth network.
eir concrete constructions are built on partitioned KEM, which can be regarded as an instance of divisible online/offline KEM. As with DOS and MDOE, partitioned KEMs have divided encapsulation algorithms, enc 1 (λ) and enc 2 (pk), both of which output partial encapsulations C 1 and C 2 .
Tag-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism. We introduce the notion of divisible online/offline tag-based KEM (DOTK),
which is a tag-based analogue of divisible online/offline KEM, i.e., partitioned KEM.
A divisible online/offline tag-based key encapsulation mechanism DOTK consists of the following algorithms: init( ) ⟶ λ (the public parameter generation algorithm): it outputs public parameters λ to be used by all parties. Public parameters λ contains a description of the session key space, DOTK.K. gen(λ) ⟶ (sk, pk) (the key generation algorithm): it generates a key pair (sk, pk) for decapsulation and encapsulation. enc 1 (λ, τ) ⟶ (φ, C 1 ) (the first key encapsulation algorithm): given public parameters λ and a tag τ ∈ 0, 1 { } * , it outputs state information φ and a partial encapsulation C 1 . We require that C 1 ≠ ε. enc 2 (φ, pk) ⟶ (K, C 2 ) (the second key encapsulation algorithm): given state information φ and a public key pk, it outputs a pair (K, C 2 ), where K ∈ DOTK.K is a generated session key and C 2 is a partial encapsulation of K. dec(λ, sk, τ, C 1 , C 2 ) ⟶ K (the deterministic decapsulation algorithm): given a secret key sk, a tag τ, and encapsulations (C 1 , C 2 ), it outputs either a session key K or an error symbol ⊥.
We require the correctness for DOTK, namely, for any λ ⟵ DOTK.init( ), any (sk, pk) ⟵ DOTK.gen(λ), any
We define the security notion of indistinguishability against adaptive tag and adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks ((k, n, q)-IND-tag-CCA).
{ } and n, q ∈ N. Let DOTK be a DOTK scheme, and let A be an adversary. e (k, n, q)-IND-tag-CCA-advantage of A against DOTK is defined as
where the attack game G (k,n,q)-IND-tag-CCA DOTK is defined in Figure 3 .
We say that DOTK is (t, q d , ϵ)-(k, n, q)-IND-tag-CCA-secure if Adv (k,n,q)-IND-tag-CCA DOTK (A) ≤ ϵ holds for any adversary A that runs in time t and makes at most q d queries to the oracle dec.
Construction. Here, we give a concrete example of (1, 1)-IND-tag-CCA-secure divisible online/offline tag-based KEM scheme with lightweight enc 2 algorithm that requires only one regular exponentiation in G T of bilinear groups. Security and Communication Networks e construction of our tag-based KEM is similar to the one of partitioned KEM [14] that is based on the IBE-based KEM from Boyen et al. [17, 18] . e concrete scheme DOTK BMW is described in Figure 4 , where (G, G, G T ) is a bilinear group, i.e., G, G, and G T are cyclic groups of prime order p, equipped with a bilinear map e : G × G ⟶ G T (a bilinear map e : G × G ⟶ G T satisfies the following properties: (1) bilinearity: e(g a , h b ) � e(g, h) ab for any g ∈ G, any h ∈ G, and any a, b ∈ Z; (2) efficient computability for any input pair; (3) nondegeneracy: e(g, h) ≠ 1 G T for any g ∈ G/1 G and any h ∈ G/1 G ), H : G ⟶ Z p is a target collision resistant hash function, and CH is a secure chameleon hash function. As with the partitioned KEM in [14] , our scheme has no second partial ciphertext, i.e., C 2 � ε, which is desirable when algorithm enc 2 is executed in the bandwidth-restricted environment. We can verify that the scheme is
proof is similar with the original proof in [17] .
Signcryptions.
e two features of MDO cryptography, i.e., incremental processing and sending, can show their full advantages when applying to signcryptions, where the sender-side algorithm has multiple input arguments that can be given incrementally in most cases. erefore, in the rest of this paper, we focus on the notion of multidivisible online/ offline signcryption (MDOSC).
In MDOSC schemes, a signcryption algorithm is split into three subalgorithms, each of which can be processed incrementally, and their output can be transmitted incrementally. A formal definition, security notions, and a generic construction of MDOSC are described in the following sections.
Multidivisible Online/Offline Signcryptions
We first introduce multidivisible online/offline signcryption (MDOSC). en, we formally define its security models in terms of confidentiality and unforgeability.
Syntax. Definition 4.
A multidivisible online/offline signcryption scheme, MDOSC, consists of the following algorithms: init( ) ⟶ λ (the public parameter generation algorithm): it outputs public parameters λ to be used by all parties gen S (λ) ⟶ (sk S , pk S ) (the sender key generation algorithm): it generates a private/public key pair (sk S , pk S ) for a sender gen R (λ) ⟶ (sk R , pk R ) (the receiver key generation algorithm): it generates a private/public key pair (sk R , pk R ) for a receiver sc 1 (λ, sk S , pk S ) ⟶ (φ 1 , Σ 1 ) (the first signcryption algorithm): given public parameter λ and sender's key pair (sk S , pk S ), it outputs state information φ 1 and partial ciphertext Σ 1 sc 2 (φ 1 , pk R ) ⟶ (φ 2 , Σ 2 ) (the second signcryption algorithm): given state information φ 1 and recipient's public key pk R , it outputs new state information φ 2 and partial ciphertext Σ 2 sc 3 (φ 2 , m) ⟶ Σ 3 (the third signcryption algorithm): given state information φ 2 and plaintext m, it outputs partial ciphertext Σ 3 unsc(λ, sk R , pk R , pk S , Σ 1 , Σ 2 , Σ 3 ) ⟶ m (the deterministic unsigncryption algorithm): given public parameters λ, recipient's key pair (sk R , pk R ), sender's public key pk S , and partial ciphertexts Σ 1 , Σ 2 , and Σ 3 , it outputs either plaintext m or error symbol ⊥ We require the correctness for MDOSC, namely, for any
We say that a MDOSC scheme is a 2-divisible online/ offline signcryption (2-DOSC, for short) scheme if Σ 2 is not null. Similarly, if Σ 1 is not null, we call it as 3-DOSC scheme.
Confidentiality.
As for confidentiality, we define the indistinguishability against insider-chosen ciphertext attacks (or insider-chosen plaintext attacks) in the dynamic multiuser model, based on the same notion for standard (i.e., nondivisible) signcryption [19] . As with the indistinguishability of MDO encryption [14] , we introduce the level of ciphertext divisibility, k, to express the following three distinct situations: (k � 1) all the ciphertext Σ 1 , Σ 2 , and Σ 3 are made public at the same time; (k � 2) Σ 1 and Σ 2 are made public at the same time, then Σ 3 is published; (k � 3) Σ 1 , Σ 2 , and Σ 3 are made public one by one. Notice that the case of k � 1 is covered by the standard dM-IND-iCCA notion for signcryptions [19] , whereas the case of k � 2, 3 corresponds to the incremental sending situation of MDO cryptography. Adversaries in the latter situations have more capabilities; for example, the adversary in the case of k � 3 can choose the target recipient after observing Σ 1 and can choose challenge messages (m 0 , m 1 ) after knowing Σ 2 as well as Σ 1 . Our definition captures these types of adversaries using three signcryption oracles. 
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Security and Communication Networks 7
In addition, the (k, n, q)-dM-IND-iCPA-advantage of A against DOSC is defined in a similar fashion with (k, n, q)-dM-IND-iCCA-advantage, except that the adversary has no access to oracle unsc, i.e., q d � 0, in game G (k,n,q)-dM-IND-iCPA DOSC . 4.3. Unforgeability. As for unforgeability, we define the (strong) unforgeability against insider chosen-message attacks in the dynamic multiuser model. Similar to the confidentiality notion, we use the level k of divisibility to express the three distinct situations. Note that the case of k � 1 is equivalent to the standard dM-sUF-iCMA for signcryptions [19] . e adversary in the case of k � 3 can take more flexible strategy: it can decide the target recipient key pk R after observing Σ 1 and can query the signcryption oracle with a message m after knowing Σ 2 as well as Σ 1 .
Let DOSC be a MDOSC scheme, and let A be an adversary. e (k, n)-dM-X-iCMA-advantage of A against DOSC is defined as
where the attack game G (k,n)-dM-X-iCMA DOSC is defined in Figure 6 .
We say that DOSC is (t, q s , ϵ)-(k, n)-dM-X-iCMAsecure if Adv (k,n)-dM-X-iCMA DOSC (A) ≤ ϵ holds for any adversary A that runs in time t.
Relations between Security Notions for MDOSCs
In this section, we clarify the relations between the security notions defined in the previous section in terms of confidentiality and unforgeability. e result is summarized in Figure 7 , where (k, n, q) denotes the notion of (k, n, q) -dM-IND-iCCA-security in the left-hand side, whereas (k, n) denotes the notion of (k, n)-dM-sUF-iCMA-security in the right-hand side. Note that for any k, k ′ ∈ 1, 2, 3 { }, n, n ′ ∈ N, and q, q ′ ∈ N such that k ≥ k ′ , n ≥ n ′ , and q ≥ q ′ ,
Confidentiality.
e following two theorems say that for any k ∈ 1, 2, 3 { }, (k, 1, 1)-dM-IND-iCCA-security implies (k, n, q)-dM-IND-iCCA-security with reduction loss polynomial in the number n of receivers as well as the number q of challenge queries.
en, DOSC is
Using the hybrid argument in a similar fashion with [20] , we can easily obtain the proof of eorem 1.
As for the case of k � 3, the hybrid argument cannot be trivially applied due to the difficulty of the simulation of oracle sc 1 in (3, n, q)-dM-IND-iCCA, which is called nq times, using oracle sc 1 * in (3, 1, 1) -dM-IND-iCCA, which can be called only once. Responding to the adversary's query to sc 1 with Σ (j) 1 , the simulator for (3, n, q)-dM-IND-iCCA first chooses (i * , q * ) ∈ [n] × [q] and uses its given single public key pk * as a key pk i * of the user i * . en, the simulator uses its given oracle access to sc1 * in (3, 1, 1 
1 will be used for the q * -th query related to the target user i * , whereas it computes Σ (j) 1 by the simulator itself otherwise. Here, the simulator has to guess whether Σ (j) 1 will be used for the q * -th challenge query to i * before a subsequent invocation of sc 2 . To overcome this issue, we use a naive guessing approach and obtain the following reduction:
e proof is given in Appendix B.1. Remark 1. We can apply the above argument to the multidivisible online/offline encryptions (MDOEs) to get a same polynomial reduction from (3, 1, 1)-CCA to (3, n, q)-CCA for MDOEs. e obtained reduction is significantly tighter than the previous one shown in [14] where only superpolynomial one was provided.
Next, we show that (2, 1, 1)-dM-IND-iCCA-security implies (3, 1, 1)-dM-IND-iCCA-security as follows:
Proof. In the single-user setting, i.e., n � 1, the adversary has no choice of the recipient i when it invokes oracle sc 2 (j, i). Hence, the successive invocations of sc 1 (sk S , pk S ) and sc 2 (j, i) in (3, 1, 1)-dM-IND-iCCA game is essentially equivalent to the invocation of the oracle sc 12 (sk S , pk S , i) in (2, 1, 1)-dM-IND-iCCA.
Finally, we show the separation between (1, ·, ·) -dM-IND-iCCA and (2, ·, ·)-dM-IND-iCCA. Specifically, we provide a (1, 1, 1)-dM-IND-iCCA-secure but not (2, 1, 1) -dM-IND-iCCA-secure 3-DOSC scheme, 3DOSC R , as an evidence of the separation. Scheme 3DOSC R is described in Figure 8 . 
Unforgeability.
First, we show the following implications with regard to the number of senders.
Proof. e adversary attacking (k, 1)-dM-sUF-iCMA can simulate signcryption oracles for the adversary attacking (k, n)-dM-sUF-iCMA, using its given oracles (for the single target sender) as well as its generating n-1 sender key pairs. Contrary to the confidentiality notions, note that the first signcryption oracle, sc 1 , has the sender index i as its input so that its simulation can be done without any guessing.
Next, we show separations among (k, ·)-dM-sUF-iCMA for k ∈ 1, 2, 3 { }.
□ Theorem 6 ((1, 1)-sUF ↛ (2, 1)-sUF ⟶ (3, 1)-sUF). Assume there exists a (2, 1)-sUF-CMA-secure and smooth DOS. en, there exists 3-DOSC schemes 3DOSC S1 and 3DOSC S2 such that the former is secure in the sense of (1, 1)-dM-sUF-iCMA but which is not secure in the sense of Figure 8 : Constructions of 3DOSC R , 3DOSC S1 , and 3DOSC S2 used to prove eorem 4 and eorem 6. Boxed parts with superscript X are evaluated only in 3DOSC X .
(2, 1)-dM-UF-iCMA, whereas the latter is secure in the sense of (2, 1)-dM-sUF-iCMA but which is not secure in the sense of (3, 1)-dM-UF-iCMA.
Proof (sketch). 3DOSC S1 and 3DOSC S2 are described in Figure 8 . In order to show that 3DOSC S1 (or 3DOSC S2 ) is not (2, 1)-dM-UF-iCMA-secure (or (3, 1)-dM-UF-iCMAsecure), we construct adversary A 1 (or A 2 ) shown in Figure 9 . Note that oracle sc 3 (or sc 2 ) always generates d * S � sk S as an answer to the query m � σ * 1 so that A can output any forgery using sk S .
On the other hand, we can show that 3DOSC S1 (or 3DOSC S2 ) is (1, 1)-dM-sUF-iCMA-secure (or (2, 1)-dM-sUF-iCMA-secure) in a similar fashion with the proof of eorem 8 shown later. □
MDOSC Construction
In this section, we provide a generic construction of MDOSC with security proofs and compare it with previous signcryption schemes. Using a (divisible) online/offline tag-based KEM, a divisible online/offline signature scheme, and a DEM as building blocks, we can derive 3-DOSC scheme 3DOSC. 3DOSC is described in Figure 8 without all boxed parts.
Security.
e following theorems guarantee the security of our construction. Theorem 7 (3DOSC is (2, 1, 1 
We can prove this theorem in a similar fashion with the proof of Lemma B.2 described in Appendix B.2.
Proof. Assume we have a t-time adversary A that makes at mostueries to oracles sc 1 , sc 2 , and sc3 in order to break (3, 1)-dM-sUF-iCMA security of 3DOSC. We will construct adversary B exploiting A as a black box to attack (2, 1)-sUF-CMA security of DOS. For any A, we will show the following relation holds:
In order to prove equation (1), we use G 0 and G 1 described in Figure 10 . As with the proof of Lemma B.2, we simplify the game description by omitting or modifying the statements and the variables that play no role when n � 1.
Game G 0 is equivalent to the original attack game played by A against 3DOSC. Hence, we have
Game G 1 is identical to G 0 except the following: computations of DOS.sign1 and DOS.sign2 are replaced by oracle invocations of sign1 and sign2, respectively; one of the winning condition v 2 is replaced by v 2 ′ . Note that sign1, sign2, and v 2 ′ are exactly the ones in G (2,1)-sUF-CMA DOS described in Figure 2 .
Oracles sign1 and sign2 here can be used to simulate the original behavior of G 0 so that A's views in these two games are equivalent.
In addition, we claim that v 2 � 1 implies v 2 ′ � 1. Let us assume v 2 ′ � 0, i.e., there exists some j * such that (pk (j * )
. en, K (j * ) � K * also holds because of the correctness property of DOTK. Furthermore, C
where the second equality follows from one-to-one property of DEM. Hence, v 2 � 0 holds since we now have j ′ such that (pk
3 ) equals to (pk * R , m * ,
. erefore, it follows that
We now construct adversary B satisfies the following relation:
e description of adversary B is shown in Figure 11 . We can see adversary B makes at mostueries to sign1 as well as sign2, and its running time t ′ � t + O(q). It is easy to verify that A's view in G (2,1)-sUF-CMA DOS (B) is equivalent to the one in G 1 so that the above relation holds.
In summary, we now have equation (1) . Combining it with the assumptions that DOS is (t ′ , q ′ , ϵ ′ )-(2, 1)-sUF -CMA-secure, we have Adv (3,1)-dM-sUF-iCMA 3DOSC (A) ≤ ϵ ′ , which implies that 3DOSC is (t, q, ϵ)-(3, 1)-dM-sUF-iCMA-secure for ϵ � ϵ ′ , as desired.
From eorems 2, 3, and 5, it follows that 3DOSC has the strongest security in the sense of both confidentiality and unforgeability: □ Corollary 1 (3DOSC is (3, n, q) 
Security and Communication Networks Figure 9 : Description of adversary A 1 (or A 2 ) attacking (2, 1)-dM-sUF-iCMA (or (3, 1)-dM-sUF-iCMA) security of 3DOSC S1 (or 3DOSC S2 ). Tables 1 and 2 , we present a comparison of our 3DOSC construction with previous signcryption constructions in various viewpoints. Here, we consider the following three signcryption schemes (including ours) that satisfy the strongest notions of insider security in the multiuser setting without relying on random oracles: CMSM: the standard (i.e., not online/offline) signcryption scheme proposed by Chiba et al. [21] that consists of TBKEM, digital signature, and DEM. Here, we instantiate it with TBKEM tBMW1 , TBKEM obtained from the PKE scheme by Boyen et al. [18] and Boneh-Boyen signature scheme DS BB [22] . GIESC: the incrementally executable signcryption scheme [12] that consists of TBKEM, digital signature, one-time signature, and DEM. Here, we instantiate it with TBKEM tBMW1 , DS BB , and the specific DL-based one-time signature scheme OTS M [23] . 3DOSC: our proposed MDOSC described in Figure 8 without all boxed parts, which consists of DOTK, DOS, and DEM. Here, we instantiate it with DOTK BMW , a concrete (1, 1)-IND-tag-CCA-secure DOTK described in Section 3.3, and the concrete DOS DOS GWXT proposed by Gao et al [4] .
Comparison. In
Note that we do not specify any instance of DEM since the selection of DEM does not cause the efficiency difference in the comparison.
Computational costs are measured in the same way as [21] , that is, [a, b; c] denotes a exponentiations, b multiexponentiations, and c pairing computations, and W denotes computation of the Waters hash [24] . Other computational overhead caused by multiplications, hash functions, and symmetric key primitives are ignored.
In terms of storage and ciphertext size, |G| and |G T | denote the size of a bilinear group element from G and G T , respectively. Similarly, |Z p | denotes the size of a group element of Z p , whereas |H| denotes the output length of target-collision resistant hash function. e appended numerical values are instance bit-length of storage and ciphertext when we assume |G| � |Z p | � |H| � 160 bits and |G T | � 1024 bits to achieve 80-bit security. We also assume |m| � 80 to capture typical IoTuse cases where messages sent by IoT devices are significantly shorter than other cases.
Our construction exploits the multidivisible feature effectively to achieve both the shortest ciphertext size and the least computational cost in the phase 3 (i.e., online phase). With our DOSC, the expensive encryption process DOTK.enc 1 can also be performed in the phase 1 (i.e., before being given the recipient's public key), whereas it can be only in the phase 2 (i.e., after being given the recipient's public key) with GIESC. All the advantages enable lightweight IoT devices to transmit confidential as well as authenticated messages to the recipient devices in IoTapplication scenarios as described in Section 1. CMSM [21] GIESC [12] Ours: 3DOSC 
Conclusions
We presented a general concept of multidivisible online/ offline cryptography (MDO cryptography), which covers the previous works including online/offline cryptographic schemes, divisible online/offline signatures, incrementally executable signcryptions, and multidivisible online/offline encryptions. We then presented the notion of multidivisible online/offline signcryptions (MDOSCs) as novel application of MDO cryptography. We defined several security notions for MDOSCs and show implications and separations between these security notions. We also presented a generic construction of MDOSC that achieves the strongest security notions with regard to confidentiality and unforgeability. MDOSC schemes allow the computationally restricted and/ or bandwidth-restricted devices to transmit signed ciphertexts with low computational overhead and/or low-bandwidth network.
Appendix

A. Data Encapsulation Mechanism
A data encapsulation mechanism (DEM) consists of the following algorithms:
init( ) ⟶ λ (the public parameter generation algorithm): it outputs public parameters λ to be used by all parties. Public parameters λ contains a description of the key space, DEM.K, which is usually identical to KEM.K. We will generally assume that all algorithms take λ as an implicit input, even if it is not explicitly stated enc(λ, K, m) ⟶ C (the encryption algorithm): it takes as input the private key K ∈ DEM.K, and a message m from the associated message space, and outputs a ciphertext C dec(λ, K, C) ⟶ m (the deterministic decryption algorithm): it takes as input the private key K ∈ DEM.K, and a ciphertext C, and outputs either a message m or an error symbol ⊥
We require the correctness for DEM, namely, for any λ ⟵ DEM.init( ), any K ∈ DEM.K, and any m, we have DEM.dec(λ, K, DEM.enc(λ, K, m)) � m.
A DEM DEM is said to be one-to-one if for any K, C, and C′, DEM.dec(K, C) � DEM.dec(K, C ′ ) ≠ ⊥ implies C � C ′ . In other words, for any given K and m, there is at most one ciphertext C such that DEM.dec(K, C) � m. As described in [25] , this property is quite natural for a large number of DEMs.
We recall the security notion of indistinguishability against one-time chosen ciphertext attacks, IND-OTCCA, and its stronger variant, IND-P0-C2. e former is defined in [26] , whereas the latter is defined in [27] . e decryption oracle in IND-OTCCA game can be accessed only after the adversary obtains the challenge ciphertext, whereas the one in IND-P0-C2 does not have such restriction.
Let X ∈ IND-OTCCA, IND-P0-C2 { }. e X-advantage of A against DEM is defined as 
where the attack game G X DEM is defined in Figure 12 . We say that DEM is (t, q, ϵ)-X-secure if Adv X DEM (A) ≤ ε holds for any adversary A that runs in time t and makes at mostueries to the oracle DEM_dec.
B. Proofs of Theorems
B.1. Proof of eorem 2. Assume we have a t-time adversary A that takes n receivers' public keys, makes at most nq queries to sc 1 , makes at mostueries per receiver to sc 2 , makes at most nq queries to sc 3 , and makes at most q d queries to unsc, in order to break (3, n, q)-dM-IND-iCCA security of DOSC. en, we will construct a t ′ -time adversary B that takes a single receiver's public key, makes only one query to sc 1 , makes only one query to sc 2 , makes only one query to sc 3 , makes at most q d queries to unsc, and exploits A as a black box to attack the (3, 1, 1)-dM-IND-iCCA security of DOSC. For any A, we will show the following relation holds:
(B.2)
In order to prove equation (B.2), we use the game sequence G u l , where l ∈ [0, nq] and u ∈ [0, 1], shown in Figure 13 . Our proof is via a hybrid argument in a similar fashion with [20] . We can see that the A's view in game G 0 0 is equivalent to the one in G Pr BD 1 l .
(B.5) e last equality holds because if BD occurs then the output of game G 1 l is a random bit. We now show how to construct adversary B. e attack game defining (3, 1, 1)-dM-IND-iCCA of DOSC and the description of adversary B against it are described in Figure 14 . Note that oracle sc 1 * , sc 2 * , sc 3 * , and unsc * in G (3,1,1 
are simplified but equivalent versions of sc 1 , sc 2 , sc 3 , and unsc, respectively. We can see adversary B makes one query to sc 1 * , one query to sc 2 * , one query to sc 3 * and at most q d queries to unsc * , and its running time t ′ � t + O(nq). In addition, for any l ∈ [nq], we can see that the A's view in game G (3,1,1 
. erefore, for any l ∈ [nq], it follows that 2Pr G (3,1,1 
Combining equation (B.2) with the assumptions that DOSC is (t ′ , q d , ϵ)-(3, 1, 1)-dM-IND-iCCA-secure, we have Adv 2, 1, 1 )-iCPA-secure). ere exists an adversary against (2, 1, 1)-dM-IND-iCPA security of 3DOSC R which has advantage one.
Proof. We show the description of adversary A against it in Figure 15 . 
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In game G (2,1,1)-dM-IND-iCPA 3DOSC R (A), when b � 1, oracle sc 3 always generates d * R � 1 as an answer to the query m 1 � σ * 1 so that A outputs 1 with probability one. On the other hand, when b � 0, oracle sc 3 always generates d * R � 1 as an answer to the query m 0 ≠ σ * 1 so that A outputs 0 with probability one. Hence, advantage Adv (2,1,1)-dM-IND-iCPA 3DOSC R (A) equals to 1. Note that this attack is CPA because adversary A does not need the unsigncryption oracle at all.
Next, we show that 3DOSC R is (1, 1, 1 )-dM-IND-iCCA-secure as the following lemma: Proof. Assume we have a t-time adversary A that makes at most q d queries to unsc in order to break (1, 1, 1)-dM-IND-iCCA security of 3DOSC R . We will construct two adversaries B and C that exploit A as a black box, where B attacks the (1, 1, 1)-IND-tag-CCA security of DOTK and C attacks the IND-OTCCA security of DEM. For any A, we will show the following relation holds:
Adv (1,1,1 In order to prove equation (B.8), we describe a game sequence in Figure 16 . Note that we simplify the game description by omitting or modifying the statements and the variables that play no role when n � q � 1. In particular, we replace the superscript · (j) by · * since j is fixed in the game when n � q � 1. Similarly, the public key pk R,i is fixed to pk * R . Game G 0 is equivalent to the original attack game played by A against 3DOSC R . Hence, we have Game G 4 is identical to G 3 except for omitting the conditional return statement in unsc. As with the above argument, we have
We now construct adversary C satisfies the following relation:
We show the attack game defining IND-OTCCA of DEM and the description of adversary C against it in Figure 18 . We can see adversary C makes at most q d queries to DEM_dec, and its running time t ′ � t + O(q d ). It is not hard to verify that G IND-OTCCA DEM (C) is equivalent to G 4 (A), which implies the above equation. Note that if (pk S , σ 1 , C 1 ) � (pk * S , σ * 1 , C * 1 ) holds in unsc, then C 2 ≠ C * 2 always holds. Hence, C * 2 is never queried to DEM_dec in game G 3 so that adversary C can replace all executions of DEM.dec by the invocations of oracle DEM_dec.
In summary, equation (B.8) holds as follows: 
□
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